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BEYOND STEREOTYPING IN EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE:
REFRAMING THE EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM COMBAT

Valorie K. Vojdik*
In United States v. Virginia' (Virginia), the United States Supreme
Court held that Virginia could not exclude qualified women from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) based upon generalizations about the abilities
2
of women, even if such generalizations are true for most women. Writing
for the majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg explained that states may not
use claims of gender difference to demean women or "to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women." 3 The Court dismissed Virginia's argument that women would destroy the institution, impair unit cohesion, and disrupt male bonding as the type of doomsday prediction used throughout history to exclude women. 4
Many scholars consider Virginia to be a classic example of the antistereotyping principle that both animates and limits the Court's gender
equality jurisprudence. 5 Because Virginia protects the right of the exceptional woman to be treated as an individual rather than as a member of a
group, Virginia has been read to vindicate formal equality.6 This reading is
consistent with the supposed dichotomy between anti-subordination and
anti-classification principles in the Supreme Court's equal protection doc-

*
Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law. I would like to thank the
following persons for their valuable comments and support: Alfred Brophy, Jerome Bruner, Jack Chin,
Marion Crain, Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Taylor Flynn, Anne Goldstein, Joyce McConell, Maijorie
McDiarmid, and Ann Scales. In addition, I would like to thank Grace Long, of the Alabama Law Review,
for her valuable assistance.
I.
518 U.S. 515 (1996).
2.
Id. at 550.
3.
Id. at 534.
4.
Id. at 540-46.
5.
See, e.g., Serena Mayeri, ConstitutionalChoices: Legal Feminism and the HistoricalDynamics
of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755 (2004); Mary Anne Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns":
ConstitutionalSex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447
(2000).
6.
See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Assimilation, Marriage,and Lesbian Literature, 75 TEMP. L. REV.
709 (2002) (arguing that Virginia exemplified concern for the assimilation of women into dominant and
idealized male groups); Erin Daly, The Limits of the ConstitutionalImagination:Equal Protectionin the
Era of Assimilation, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 121, 125 (1999) ("Yet, the VMI litigation is troublesome
because it demonstrates the poverty of the feminist vision.... If mainstream modern feminism goes no
further than that, it is in a sorry state. The state says women cannot be more like men, the Court says
women can."). See also Kristina Brittenham, Note, Equal Protection Theory and the Harvey Milk High
School: Why Anti-SubordinationAlone is Not Enough, 45 B.C. L. REV. 869, 902 (2004).
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trine.7 According to most scholars, the Supreme Court has repudiated its
interpretation of equal protection in Brown v. Board of Education8 as prohibiting state action that subordinates groups. 9 In its place, most scholars
think the Court has substituted an anti-classification principle that interprets
the guarantee of equal protection to prohibit state action that classifies individuals based upon their membership in a protected group.' 0
In this Article, I argue that Virginia expresses both anti-classification
and anti-subordination values. While Virginia invokes the anti-stereotyping
principle to condemn gender classifications that exclude all women, regardless of their individual merit, the decision also expresses a commitment to
anti-subordination principles. Rejecting the presumed symmetry of formal
equality, the Court held that states may not rely upon claims of gender differences "to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority
of women."" Ignoring the district court's factual findings that the admission
of women would materially change VMI, the Court dismissed such arguments, claiming that they were the same assertions as used throughout history to exclude women from other all-male institutions-a move that situates VMI's exclusion of women within a system of subordination.' 2 Further,
the Court rejected formal equality's goal of assimilation based upon male
norms and required VMI to make accommodations in its program to admit
women. 13
Dissolving the dichotomy between the anti-subordination and anticlassification approaches is an important step in constructing litigation
strategies to shift the Court's understanding of how gender discrimination
operates to subordinate women. As Reva Siegal and Jack Balkin have argued, courts have used anti-classification discourse to limit the expression
of anti-subordination values, but courts have also used the anti-classification
framework to express concerns about state practices that enforce the second-class status of less powerful groups. 14 While the Court has not abandoned anti-classification analysis, it has broadened the discursive space

7.
See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordinationand Anticlassification Values in ConstitutionalStruggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1533 (2004).
8.
349 U.S. 294 (1955).
9.
Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the
Case of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, " 108 YALE L.J. 485, 558 (1998).
10.
See Siegel, supra note 7, at 1472-73; see also Mark Tushnet, The Return of the Repressed:
Groups, Social Welfare Rights, and the EqualProtection Clause, ISSUES INLEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (2002),
available at http://bepress.com/ils/iss2/art7 (arguing that constitutional doctrine has rejected a grouporiented approach to equal protection law); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOwARD A FEMINIST THEORY

OF THE STATE 218 (1989) ("Laws or practices that express or reflect sex 'stereotypes,' understood as
inaccurate overgeneralized attitudes often termed 'archaic' or 'outmoded,' are at the core of [liberal
definitions of discrimination.]"); Yoshino, supra note 9, at 558 (stating that the Supreme Court appears
to have rejected the anti-subordination principle's class-based view).
11.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534.
12.
Id. at 533.
13.
Id. at 551 n.19.
14.
Siegel, supra note 7, at 1474.
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within equal protection doctrine to understand gender discrimination as a
system of subordination.' 5
Litigation strategies that illuminate the particular practices within social
institutions that subordinate women are well-suited to enrich the courts'
understanding of discrimination. A legal challenge to the continued exclusion of women from direct ground combat is one example of this strategy.
While the combat exclusion can easily be challenged as improper gender
stereotyping, it is better framed as an institutional practice that constructs
warriors as male and masculine while demeaning women. Challenging the
combat exclusion, I argue, shifts judicial attention from stereotyping to concrete practices of subordination.
My argument proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes the Court's gender
equality jurisprudence in Virginia and other recent decisions to examine the
extent to which the Court has considered anti-subordination concerns and
values within its anti-classification framework.
Part II addresses the question of how to enrich the Court's understanding of gender discrimination beyond stereotyping. In this section, I draw
upon sociological theories of gender that focus on the social practices within
institutions that construct and reinforce gender inequality. Several legal
scholars have relied upon this literature to enrich the courts' understanding
of the mechanism and harm of sexual harassment in the workplace.' 6 This
scholarship offers a particularized account of sexual harassment as a means
of devaluing and subordinating women in the workplace, dissolving the
dichotomy between anti-classification and anti-subordination concerns.
In Part III, I illustrate how this approach could be used to frame a legal
challenge to the exclusion of women from direct ground combat and shift
the attention of courts from gender stereotyping to the institutional subordination of women in the military. The Department of Defense (DOD) continues to exclude women from direct ground combat, 17 denying women access to 15% of total available positions in the armed forces, regardless of
whether or not they are qualified.' 8 To justify its categorical exclusion, the
15.
See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principleand Practiceof Women's "Full Citizenship": A Case
Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 773 (2002) (arguing that the language in Virginia that gender classifications "may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.... represents a substantially new idea within the
constitutional jurisprudence of sex discrimination"); Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination Analysis
After United States v Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionalityof K-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 383 ("Since the Supreme Court decided Frontierov. Richardson in 1973, constitutional scrutiny of [sex-based] classifications has turned on two considerations: 'fit'-whether the
challenged practice actually serves the objective the legislature intended it to serve; and 'antisubordination'-whether the legislative objective is to disadvantage, and sometimes, whether the challenged practice has subordinating effects.") (footnote omitted); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above
All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986).
16.
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudenceof Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1169 (1998).
17.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GENDER ISSUES: INFORMATION ON DOD's ASSIGNMENT

POLICY AND DIRECT GROUND COMBAT DEFINITION 2-3 (1998) [hereinafter GENDER ISSUES].
18.
Id. at 4 ("[A]bout 221,000... of the approximately 1.4 million positions in DOD, were closed
to servicewomen [in 1998].").
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military relies on gender stereotypes: women lack the physical and emotional strength to fight and kill; their presence will impair male bonding and
unit cohesion; their integration will reduce "military effectiveness."' 9
Although the direct ground combat exclusion can be easily framed as a
case of impermissible stereotyping, a legal challenge should focus on the
institutional practices within the military that construct warriors as male and
masculine, and simultaneously denigrate women and femininity. 20 The
ground combat exclusion is not merely a product of mistaken gender stereotypes; it rests upon the military's desire to define and preserve the identity
of the warrior as male and masculine. 2' As General Robert H. Barrow, a
former commandant of the Marine Corps, explained: "War is a man's work.
...
When
you get right down to it, you have to protect the manliness of
22
war.,

A legal challenge to the direct ground combat exclusion does not
merely vindicate formal equality or anti-classification principles. By looking closely at the practices inside the military as an institution, the exclusion
of women from direct ground combat can be seen as a means of subordination rather than a classificatory error. Like the military's now-discredited
policy of racial segregation, the exclusion rationalizes the inequality and
subordination of women-not only in the military, but within American
society as well. This type of analysis of institutional practices that denigrate
and subordinate women can be used to enrich judicial understanding of gender discrimination as not merely an error in classification, but also as part of
a system of subordination that reflects hostility toward treating women as
equals.
I.

GENDER DISCRIMINATION As SUBORDINATION WITHIN THE
ANTI-CLASSIFICATIONS FRAMEWORK

Unlike classifications based upon race or national origin, gender classifications have not been afforded strict scrutiny by the Supreme Court.23 In
Frontiero v. Richardson,24 the Court recognized that "our Nation has had a
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" similar to that experienced by African-Americans. 25 The Court has assumed, however, that there
19.

See, e.g., Kingsley Browne, Women in War, An Evolutionary Perspective, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 51,

60-68 (2001); PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 24-27 (1992) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N].

20.

See Valorie K. Vojdik, GenderOutlaws: ChallengingMasculinity in TraditionallyMale Institu-

tions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 68, 113 (2002).

21.
See Valorie K. Vojdik, The Invisibility of Gender in War, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 261,
266 (2002); Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuitof Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38
UCLA L. REV. 499, 499-502 (1991).
22.
Michael Wright, The Marine Corps Faces the Future, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 16 (quoting General Robert H. Barrow).
23.
See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135-36 (1994).
24.
411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
25.
Id. at 684-85.
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are differences between men and women that may justify differential treatment.26 The Court repeatedly has observed that legislators historically have
relied upon outdated assumptions that sex is an accurate proxy for more
germane bases of classification.27 Accordingly, courts scrutinize the asserted
objective to determine whether it reflects "archaic and stereotypic notions"
about men and women. 28 To justify a sex-based classification, states must
offer an "exceedingly persuasive" justification that meets the requirements
of intermediate scrutiny; that is, the classification must be substantially related to an important state purpose. 29
Most of the Court's jurisprudence has focused on the use of overly
broad gender stereotypes and traditional gender norms to deny women access to equal opportunities. 30 Courts have rejected two types of stereotypes:
descriptive stereotypes, which purport to describe the presumed abilities and
interests of women, and normative stereotypes, which specify the appropriate roles of men and women in our society. 3' Even assuming that stereotypes may contain a shred of truth, the Court has repeatedly held that states
may not use gender as a proxy to exclude or deny women opportunities for
which they are qualified.32
By concentrating on stereotypes, the Court's equality jurisprudence has
tended to focus on gender as a category of classification rather than as a
system of subordination. The Court's recent jurisprudence has defined equal
protection as the right of the individual to be treated as an individual, rather
than as a member of a group. 33 The constitutional wrong becomes the classification of individuals as members of groups. The remedy lies in treating
men and women without regard to their sex or gender. If women demonstrate they are like men in relevant respects, then the remedy becomes admission to the existing institutions on the same terms as men. 34 While the
Court has used its remedial powers to compel the states to take affirmative
steps to dissolve racially segregated schools, historically it has not imposed
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) ("Supposed 'inherent differences'
26.
are no longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classifications. Physical differences between men and women, however, are enduring: '[T]he two sexes are not fungible; a community made up
exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community composed of both."' (quoting Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946))) (citation omitted) (brackets in original).
See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531-32; J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 138-40; Miss. Univ. for Women v.
27.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 n.10 (1982).
28.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725.
See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
29.
30.
Mary Anne Case, for example, argues that the Court's gender equality jurisprudence is based
upon the principle that states may not use gender as a proxy for other, more relevant characteristics. See
Case, supra note 5, at 1449-51.
31.
See id. at 1457.
See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 141-42.
32.
See id. at 142.
33.
34.
See Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 ALA. L. REv. 861, 869 (arguing that
"equality theory" or "liberal feminism" is grounded in the notion that men and women are "functionally
indistinguishable" and that, consequently, women have been "frequently obliged to squeeze themselves
into ill-fitting roles in andocentric institutions, rather than using their growing numbers and sometimes
distinct perspectives to transform those institutions").
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the same remedial obligations upon states that have engaged in gender segregation.35
Most scholars have interpreted the Court's gender equality jurisprudence to embrace formal equality, not substantive equality.36 As Catherine
MacKinnon explains, equal protection doctrine has been premised upon the
Aristotelian principle that things that are alike should be treated alike.37 To
the extent that men and women are similarly situated, the state must treat
them alike; if there are differences, however, states may treat men and
women differently. 38 Under this construction of equality, women are entitled to equal39 treatment only to the extent that they can prove they meet the
male norm.
While the Court's gender equality jurisprudence has largely reflected
the principle of formal equality, it has not ignored anti-subordination principles. As Ruth Colker has observed, "[t]wo sometimes conflicting principles,
anti-differentiation and anti-subordination, underlie equal protection jurisprudence."'4 In Frontiero,J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., and Virginia, the
Supreme Court analogized sex discrimination to race discrimination, identifying the system of state laws that relegated women to an inferior legal and
social status.4' In each of these cases, the Court has focused not only on the
improper use of gender stereotypes by state actors, but also upon the harm
to the status or dignity of women as a group.
In Mississippi Universityfor Women v. Hogan,4 2 the Court held that the
University (MUW) could not deny males admission to its all-female nursing
program.43 Employing anti-classification principles, the Court rejected
MUW's proffered justification that its program compensated women for
past discrimination, holding that an all-female nursing school perpetuated
traditional gender stereotypes. 44 But the Court also held that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited gender classifications that stigmatized women as
inferior or perpetuated historical discrimination, a move that embraces anti35.
See Vojdik, supra note 20, at 75 (arguing that the court should require previously all-male
institutions to eliminate facially neutral practices that perpetuate the exclusion of women).
36.
For a discussion of formal equality in gender equal protection jurisprudence, see Case, supra
note 5, at 1442-47 (defending the focus on formal equality violations in equal protection review of sexbased classifications). See also Robin L. West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 53-60 (1990); Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle:
Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/SpecialTreatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325,
328 (1985) (discussing formal equality arguments in the context of pregnancy).
37.
See MACKINNON, supra note 10, at 220-21.
38.
Id.
39.
Id. at 222.
40.
Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1003, 1003 (1986).
41.
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973) (plurality opinion); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) ("While the prejudicial attitudes toward women in this country have
not been identical to those held toward racial minorities, the similarities between the experiences of
racial minorities and women, in some contexts, 'overpower those differences."'); see also United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,542 (1996).
42.
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
43.
Id. at 724.
44.
Id.
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subordination values.45 While this language might be considered rhetorical,
Hogan analyzed MUW's female-only policy primarily in terms of its harm
to women rather than to Joseph Hogan, the male plaintiff, or to other men
seeking a nursing education.4 While the Court acknowledged that MUW's
policy forced Hogan to travel a great distance to attend another nursing program, its discussion of the harm to Hogan was relegated to a single footnote.47 The bulk of the opinion addressed the harm to females from state
gender classifications that perpetuate the notion that women are different
and inferior. In addition to focusing on the status harm to women as a
group, Hogan discussed the harm to women from the occupational segregation that resulted from MUW's policy. In a footnote, the majority observed
that the preservation of nursing as a female profession also serves to depress
the wages of female nurses. 48 Within an anti-classification framework that
expressed gender stereotyping, Hogan also expressed and vindicated antisubordination values.4 9
In J.E.B., the Court similarly held that discriminatory state laws that
stigmatize on the basis of gender or perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination also violate the Equal Protection Clause.50 The Court invalidated the government's use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective
jurors based solely on their sex.5 ' Striking individual jurors simply because
of their sex, the Court held, is based on "the very stereotype the law condemns. '5 2 Viewed through the lens of anti-classification principles, J.E.B.
can be read as a classic example of the Court's anti-stereotyping analysis,
focusing on the harm to the individual from state action that treats him or
her as a member of a particular group, rather than as an individual.5 3 Many
scholars have characterized J.E.B. as an exercise in formal equality or
sameness theory, focusing on the Court's condemnation of stereotypical
assumptions about women.-4
45. Id. at 725 ("[1f the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because
they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is
illegitimate.").
46. Id.at718.
47. See id. at724 n.8.
48.
Id. at 725 n. 15.
49.
See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1517-18 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that
the Court in Hogan "denounced the single-sex policy both because it discriminated against men and
because it reinforced the subjugation of women"); see also Denise C. Morgan, Anti-Subordination
Analysis After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality of K-12 Single-Sex Public
Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381, 424-27 (1990).
50.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136-46(1994).
51.
Id. at 143-46.
52.
Id. at 138 (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 449 U.S. 400,410 (1991)).
53.
Id. at 139 n.l 1 ("We have made abundantly clear in past cases that gender classifications that
rest on impermissible stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the generalization.").
54. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 34, at 875-78. Professor Abrams concludes that Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in J.E.B. "connected the use of peremptory challenges to remove women from a
jury with the long-standing legal rules excluding women from juries altogether." Id at 876 (citing J.E.B.,
511 U.S. at 149 (O'Connor, J. concurring)). Although noting that Blackmun likened the use of genderbased peremptories to "'practically [putting] a brand upon [women],"' she concludes that Blackmun
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The Court in J.E.B., however, did not focus solely on the harm to individual men or women, but also focused on the social meaning of the use of
gender-based peremptory challenges. The Court situated the practice within
the history of the nation's exclusion of women from federal jury service,
one of the most fundamental privileges and duties of citizenship. 55 Given
that history, the Court noted that the use of peremptory challenges based
solely on gender sends the message to the community that women are inferior. 6 The Court stated:
All persons, when granted the opportunity to serve on a jury, have
the right not to be excluded summarily because of discriminatory
and stereotypical presumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns of
historical discrimination. Striking individual jurors on the assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their gender
is "practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion
of their inferiority. 57
While Justice Blackmun's opinion plainly draws on the Court's antistereotyping analysis, he recognized that gender-based peremptory challenges "denigrate[] the dignity of the excluded juror." 58 Further, the Court
recognized that female jurors are uniquely harmed.5 9 For those women who
are excluded, the Court held that a gender-based peremptory challenge "reinvokes a history of exclusion from political participation." 6 The Court
concluded, "[t]he message it sends to all those in the courtroom, and all
those who may later learn of the discriminatory act, is that certain individuals, for no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified by state actors to decide important questions upon which reasonable persons could
disagree. '6 1
By focusing on the stigma resulting from the use of such gender-based
challenges, the Court conceptualized the nature of the harm as group harm.
As the Court explained:
The Equal Protection Clause, as interpreted by decisions of this
Court, acknowledges that a shred of truth may be contained in some
stereotypes, but requires that state actors look beyond the surface

"was able to resolve the case using an 'equality' or 'sameness' theory of feminism." Id. (quoting J.E.B.,
511 U.S. at 142, 146).
55.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 137-42.
56.
Id. at 142.
57.
Id. at 141-42 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (footnote omitted)).
58.
Id. at 142.
59.
Id.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
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before making judgments about people that are likely to stigmatize
as well as to perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination. 62
While J.E.B. appears at first blush to read as a quintessential antistereotyping decision, the decision situates the practice of gender-based
peremptory challenges within an anti-subordination framework. Within this
framework, the Court focused on the harm to women's dignity and status,
invoking their historical exclusion from the justice system by state and federal actors.
United States v. Virginia similarly can be read to express antisubordination concerns within an anti-classification framework.63 To fully

appreciate the Court's analysis, it is important to understand the factual
claims regarding men and women proffered by VMI. To defend its discriminatory policy, VMI first argued that its male-only policy was substantially related to Virginia's alleged interest in promoting single-sex education
within a diverse range of educational offerings. 64 It also argued that the admission of women would destroy VMI's unique military-style methodology.

65

At the trial before the district court, VMI offered testimony by expert
witnesses regarding alleged gender differences between men and women to
support its claim that women are not suited to its stressful military-style
program.66 In addition, VMI's experts testified that the admission of women
to West Point and other U.S. military academies resulted in a host of
changes to the institutions, from requiring dual physical fitness standards
and modifying boot sizes to hiring a gynecologist and adding blinds and
shades to the barracks.67

On the basis of this testimony, the district court issued over 500 detailed
"findings of fact" that largely recited conclusions by VMI's expert witnesses regarding alleged gender differences and the harm that would befall
VMI if women were admitted.6 8 For example, the district court found that
69
there are no less than 120 physical differences between men and women,
leading the court to conclude that most women would be unable to "participate in the 'VMI experience."' 70 Men and women have deep-seated differences in learning and developmental needs.7' Women, the court found,
could not handle the stress of the VMI system. 72 According to the district
62.
63.
1995),
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 139 n. 11 (emphasis added).
See United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407 (W.D. Va. 1991), aft'd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.
rev'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
Id.at 1412-13.
Id. at 1413-14.
Id. app. at 1432-35.
Id. app. at 1437-41.
Id. app. at 1415-43.
Id. app. at 1432.
Id. at 1414.
Id. app. at 1434-35.
See id. (discussing the developmental differences between men and women that may prevent
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court, men would not treat female cadets the same as male cadets, as
"[e]qual treatment would necessarily give way to fair treatment., 73 Women
would interfere with the male bonding, morale, and the espiritde corps necessary to sustain the VMI system.7 4 The admission of women would decrease the "intensity" of the VMI experience and reduce the morale among
the male cadets.7 5
The United States did not appeal the factual findings of the similarities
and differences between men and women.76 In affirming the district court's
decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that, "[m]en and
women are different, and our knowledge about the differences, physiological and psychological, is becoming increasingly more sophisticated. 77
The Supreme Court reviewed VMI's discriminatory policy under "skep78
tical scrutiny" and rejected Virginia's proffered justifications. The Court
held that there was no evidence that Virginia had a policy of promoting single-sex education-indeed, the state had eliminated all single-sex schools
with the exception of VMI.79 While the Court supposedly was bound by the
factual findings of the district court, it held that, even assuming that such
generalizations were true, Virginia could not exclude qualified women from
VMI, a state military-style college, based upon generalizations about
women as a group. 80
Virginia may be read as an anti-stereotyping case that protects the "exceptional" woman who is no different than a man. However, the opinion
also focused on anti-subordination values in its analysis of the equal protection doctrine. Rather than narrowly defining the right to equal protection as
the right to be treated as an individual, the majority opinion recognized that
the guarantee of equal protection insures women the full status of citizenship.81 Justice Ginsburg wrote, "[N]either federal nor state government acts
compatibly with the equal protection principle when a law or official policy
denies to women, simply because they are women, full citizenship statureequal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and contribute to society
based on their individual talents and capacities.' 8 2
The Court limited the state's ability to rely upon claims of gender difference to justify differential treatment of men and women. The Court acknowledged that gender differences exist but held that such differences
should be celebrated rather than being used by states to demean women or

women
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

from thriving in the VMI environment).
Id. app. at 1440.
Id. app. at 1438.
Id.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996).
United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 897 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534.
Id. at 534-40.
Id. at 545-46.
Id. at 532.
Id.
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to deny them opportunity.83 The majority held that states may use sex-based
classifications "to compensate women 'for particular economic disabilities
[they have] suffered,' . . . to 'promot[e] equal employment opportunity,'
[and] ...to advance the full development of the talent and capacities" of all
persons. 84 However, sex-based classifications may not be used "to
'85 create or
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.
Rather than narrowly focusing on VMI's exclusionary policy, the Court
broadened its analysis to situate VMI women within the unfortunate history
of systematic exclusion of women throughout our nation's history.86 In its
analysis, the Court concluded that VMI was no different than a host of
medical schools, law schools, the military, and other all-male occupations
that excluded women. 87 Faced with the admission of women, each institution raised the same argument offered by VMI: women would destroy the
value or essence of the institution. 88 The Court stated that police departments had resisted females seeking careers as police officers based on similar claims that women's presence would "'undermine male solidarity;' deprive male partners of adequate assistance; and lead to sexual misconduct., 89 Citing empirical studies of the impact of female police officers, the
Court observed that these fears were not confirmed by actual experience. 90
In addition, the Court cited evidence that women have successfully entered
the federal service academies, where they have graduated at the top of their
class, and that female troops have served courageously in our military, making vital contributions to our nation's national defense.91 The Court concluded, "Virginia's fears for the future of VMI may not be solidly
grounded. 92
The majority's analysis in important respects resembles the scrutiny afforded racial classifications.9 3 Scalia argued that the majority effectively
dismissed the lower court's factual findings, which the United States did not
appeal and which were therefore not properly brought before the Court. 94
83.
Id. at 533.
84.
Id. (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)).
Id. at 534; see also Hasday, supra note 15, at 808 (arguing that "Virginia seems to express a
85.
particular constitutional concern for women's 'full citizenship stature' and 'the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women."') (quoting Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532, 534).
86.
See id. at 542-45.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 544 (citations omitted).
Id.
90.
91.
Id. at 544-45.
92.
Id.
93.
Justice Scalia argued that majority departs from the "standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny." Id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting). While I suggest in this Article that the majority has departed
from traditional notions of formal equality, I disagree with Justice Scalia's larger argument that Virginia's males-only policy would survive constitutional muster under a traditional formulation of intermediate scrutiny.
94.
Id. at 585 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia notes:
Ultimately, in fact, the Court does not deny the evidence supporting these findings. It instead makes evident that the parties to this litigation could have saved themselves a great deal
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The findings that the admission of women would destroy unit cohesion and
necessitate changes that would destroy the institution arguably are not descriptive or normative stereotypes, nor did the majority label them as such.95
Instead, the majority referred to them as "generalizations" and dismissed
them as "a judgment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other
'self-fulfilling prophec[ies],' once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities. 96 In this sense, the Court's analysis seems more like the reasoning in
race discrimination cases in which alleged racial differences are no longer
heard to justify differential treatment of racial groups.97 Virginia similarly
reflects the same normative judgment with respect to claims of gender difference when used to exclude women.
Unlike formal equality, which attempts to treat men and women as individuals without regard to their gender, Virginia is not blind to gender. The
Court acknowledged that the admission of women would require VMI to
modify its program to accommodate the presence of women. 98 While VMI
argued that such changes justified keeping its program all male, the Court
explicitly rejected the argument. 99 Instead, the Court held that VMI must
accommodate the need for privacy and the different physical capabilities of
men and women, just as the military had to accommodate the increased integration of female troops.1t° Rather than requiring women to assimilate
into institutions by conforming to male expectations or norms, the Court
required VMI to change to include women. 10 1 In its remedial decree, the
Court limited the use of anti-classification analysis and formal equality,
which recognizes that states may treat men and women differently if they
are not similarly situated.102
The Court's remedial approach contrasts markedly with earlier gender
cases involving under-inclusive benefits statutes. In cases such as Heckler v.
Mathews,10 3 the Court ordered that a defendant may remedy the violation by
either extending the benefit to the excluded group or denying the benefit to
the preferred group.1°4 This remedy is consistent with the Aristotelian notion that those that are alike should be treated alike.' In Virginia, however,
of time, trouble, and expense by omitting a trial. The Court simply dispenses with the evidence submitted at trial-it never says that a single finding of the District Court is clearly erroneous-in favor of the Justices' own view of the world ....
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 542-46.
95.
96.
Id. at 517 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) (citation omitted) (bracket in original)).
Cf.id. at 532-34.
97.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 550-51 n. 19.
98.
99.
Id.
Id.
100.
101.

Id.

102.
103.
104.

See id. at 550-51.
465 U.S. 728 (1984).
ld. at 738 (citing Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970)).

105.

See SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT HISTORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 19 (2004), available

at http://www.hup.harvard.edu/pdf/FLESHO-excerpt.pdf (according to Aristotle, "it is unjust for unequals in merit to be treated equally or equals in merit to be treated unequally").
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the Court imposed the same remedy used in cases involving racially segregated schools.' 06 Citing Milliken v. Bradley,'0 7 a landmark case setting forth
the scope of a proper remedy for racial segregation in public education, the
Court held that VMI must restore the plaintiffs to the position they would
have occupied absent discrimination: "eliminate ...the discriminatory effects of the past" and "bar like discrimination in the future." 10 8 This notion
of restorative justice, though not fully developed in Virginia, is at odds with
formal equality's demand for gender neutrality. 10 9 The Court's remedial
conclusion was consistent with its limitation on the use of alleged gender
differences to discriminate: If gender differences cannot justify the denial of
rights or opportunities to women, then VMI must admit 110
women and make
women.
accommodate
to
necessary
are
changes
whatever
By expressly relying on Milliken v. Bradley in fashioning a remedy, the
Supreme Court recognized the similarity between gender and race discrimination. While VMI objected to accommodation for women, the Court explicitly noted that VMI had voluntarily changed aspects of its program to
accommodate African-American cadets in 1968.111 These changes included
the elimination of cherished traditions such as requiring students to sing
"Dixie" and salute the Confederate flag (and the tomb of General Robert E.
Lee) at ceremonies and sports events." 2 The Court also emphasized that
VMI established a recruitment program to attract African-American students and a retention program "designed to offer academic and socialcultural support to 'minority members of a dominantly white and traditionoriented student body.""' 13 Though the Court couched its analysis in terms
of VMI's ability to manage change, the Court plainly analogized VMI's
exclusion of women to its former exclusion of African-American students,
inserting its analysis as a footnote to the sentence in which the Court held
that Virginia's goal "is not substantially advanced by women's categorical
exclusion, in total disregard of their individual merit, from the Commonwealth's premier 'citizen-soldier' corps."' 1 4 To the extent that Brown v.
Board of Education recognized that racial segregation in education subordinated African-American students, 1 5 Virginia can be read to suggest that

106.
Virginia,518 U.S. at 547.
107.
433 U.S. 267 (1977).
108.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 547 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 300 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)).
109.
See Vojdik, supra note 20, at 120-21.
110.
See Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal Protection
Analysis with Ramificationsfor Pregnancy, Parenting,and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REv. 845, 863 (1997)
("Requiring VMI to alter and adjust its physical requirements and housing arrangements provides
women equal results with men: the ability to enter VMI at the same level of comfort, or discomfort, that
the men experience, neither more nor less.").
111.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 546 n.16.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. (citing United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1436-37 (W.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 44
F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
114.
Id. at 546.
115.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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VMI's males-only policy similarly subordinated women as a class, denying
them access to power and privilege.
To be clear, I am not arguing that the majority opinion rejected anticlassification analysis in favor of an anti-subordination analysis. In fact, the
Court could have taken a much stronger anti-subordination approach. For
example, the Court could have framed VMI's males-only admission policy
as similar to Virginia's anti-miscegenation law, which the Court struck
down in Loving v. Virginia. 1 6 VMI did not use sex as a proxy for some
other quality-it sought instead to exclude females qua females." 7 The
Court also could have taken a harder look at VMI as an all-male institution.
The United States did not dispute the benefits that VMI purported to bestow
upon its male cadets, an unsurprising tactical choice given that it argued
persuasively that Virginia could not deny qualified women access to a prestigious state college. 18 There was substantial evidence that VMI's program
denigrated women, however, just as the military itself employed practices
that construct masculinity as the opposite of femininity. 119 Still, the Court's
analysis went beyond a purely anti-classification approach. 20 Formal equality principles would not have required (and arguably would have prohibited)
the Court from framing VMI's males-only policy within the history of statesponsored exclusion of women from the public sphere, adopting an asymdifference and requiring VMI to modify its
metrical approach to gender
21
program to admit women.
In its most recent gender discrimination decision, the Supreme Court, in
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,122 similarly moved beyond the anti-stereotyping principle to uphold the constitutionality of the
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). 123 The Court held that the FMLA,
which requires certain employers to offer family leave to all employees, was
a valid exercise of Congress' power under Section 5 of the Equal Protection
Clause to adopt prophylactic legislation to prevent discrimination. 124
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged "[t]he
long and extensive history of sex discrimination" 25 by state actors sanctioned by the Supreme Court under the rational basis test applied to gender
discrimination prior to Reed v. Reed. 126 In his opinion, Rehnquist wrote that
such laws were based upon normative stereotypes about the proper role of
See Case, supra note 5, at 1455-57. Case makes this point nicely, noting that VMI did not use
116.
gender as a proxy for any particular quality of students. Rather, the admissions policy was designed to
exclude women qua women. See id.
Id.
117.
118.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 530, 547-51.
See Vojdik, supra note 20, at 94-96.
119.
Id. at 106-07.
120.
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531, 565 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
121.
538 U.S. 721 (2003).
122.
Id. at 740.
123.
Id. at 735.
124.
Id. at 730.
125.
126.
Id. at 729-30.
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women, for example, the related beliefs that women are, and should be, "the
center of home and family life" 127 and that legislation was appropriate to
protect the "proper discharge of [a woman's] maternal functions."'' 28 According to the Court, the traditional gender stereotype that women are the
primary caretakers of the family and the parallel stereotype that men have
no domestic responsibilities, "foster[] employers' stereotypical129views about
women's commitment to work and their value as employees."'
While Hibbs focuses on the wrong of gender stereotyping, it also offers
a nuanced view of gender discrimination in the workplace, recognizing that
these reciprocal stereotypical beliefs result in "subtle discrimination that
may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case basis." 130 This type of discrimination, the Court recognized, has been a "difficult and intractable
proble[m]" to change.131 The Court held that the persistence of such discrimination justified Congress's decision to affirmatively require employers
32
to provide unpaid family leave to covered employees.
Significantly, Rehnquist's majority opinion rejected the dissent's argument that Section 5 only authorized Congress to proscribe discrimination by
employers in granting parental leave. 133 As the dissent argued, such a statute
would be gender-neutral and, therefore, would not violate the anticlassification principle. 34 The majority rejected that argument, reasoning
that merely prohibiting discrimination would permit states to deny parental
leave to both men and women under the guise of treating men and women
equally. 35 This approach would not be an adequate remedy, the majority
reasoned, because it would operate to exclude "far more women than men
from the workplace."' 136 By creating a benefit for all eligible employees,
Congress intended "to ensure that family-care leave would no longer be
stigmatized as an inordinate drain on the workplace caused by female employees" and prevent employers from hiring men to avoid leave obligations. 137 Thus, Hibbs recognized that nondiscrimination may not afford
women equal protection; instead, affirmative steps may be required to remove the stigma from family leave and prevent employers from relying on
38
gender stereotypes.
As these cases demonstrate, the Court's gender jurisprudence is more
flexible than the traditional view of the equal protection doctrine suggests.
In J.E.B. and Virginia, the Court recognized that state-sponsored gender
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 729 (quoting Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)).
Id. (quoting Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,422 (1908)).
Id. at 736.
Id.
Id. at 737 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000)).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 737.
See id. at 750 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 738 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 737.
Id.
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discrimination results in more than mere classificatory harms, often stigmatizing or demeaning women as a group while perpetuating their exclusion
from full citizenship.139 The Court in J.E.B. considered the social meaning
of state-sponsored gender discrimination, concluding that state laws that
send the message that women and men are different violate the guarantee of
equal protection. 14° In Hibbs, the Court acknowledged that the deeply entrenched practice of gender stereotyping may require remedies that impose
affirmative obligations upon state actors to ensure equal employment opportunities for women.'14 In each of these cases, it seems that the Court did not
focus narrowly upon a particular classification that discriminated against
women, but instead broadened its analytical frame to locate the challenged
practice within the history of state laws that enforced the systematic exclusion of women from the public sphere.
I.

ADVANCING ANTI-SUBORDINATION: LOOKING AT INSTITUTIONAL
PRACTICES THAT CONSTRUCT GENDER WITHIN INSTITUTIONS

Assuming that the Court has broadened the discursive space within
equality jurisprudence to consider how gender discrimination subordinates
women, the challenge is to employ legal theories and strategies that will
continue to focus the Court's attention not on gender classifications, but on
the concrete mechanisms and harms of gender subordination. In this section,
I consider how more particularized accounts of gender discrimination in
traditionally male institutions can accomplish this goal. Specifically, this
section examines recent feminist legal scholarship that analyzes sexual harassment as an institutional practice that subordinates women in the workplace.
Critical legal scholars have sought to broaden judicial understanding of
the processes of workplace exclusion beyond gender stereotyping to expand
the reach of antidiscrimination law. Despite the enactment of Title VII, 14 2
prohibiting sex discrimination in the workplace, the American workforce
remains deeply segregated by gender.143 While Title VII has succeeded in
139.
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 141 (1994); United States v. Virginia, 518
U.S. 515, 534 (1996) ("[Sex] classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate
the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.").
140.
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142 (striking jurors because of their gender sends a message "to all those in
the courtroom, and all those who may later learn of the discriminatory act.., that certain individuals, for
no reason other than gender, are presumed unqualified").
141.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737.
142.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (2000).
143.
See Debra S. Gatton et al., The Effects of OrganizationalContext on Occupational GenderStereotyping, SEX RoLES, Apr. 1999, at 568. Gatton et al. argue:
Gender segregation in occupations has been a tradition in the U.S. work force for decades. In
fact, the degree of gender segregation in the work force has not changed much since the early
1900's. In 1985, occupations which comprised at least 70% women employed greater than
two-thirds of all working women. Moreover, while gender segregation in occupations
exhibited somewhat of a downward trend during the period between 1960 and 1990, this
trend has been remarkably slow, leaving segregation levels quite high.
Id. (citations omitted).
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eliminating many of the formal policies used in the past to deny employment to women, it has been less successful in dismantling traditionally male
institutions such as police departments, fire departments, and144other institutions that construct the ideal employee as male and masculine.
Given the persistence of gender segregation, a number of legal scholars
have drawn upon sociological and social theories of gender to illuminate the
use of harassment as a social practice that constructs the ideal worker as
male and masculine, thereby preserving the workplace for men. 45 There is a
rich literature in the field of sociology that has examined the structural barriers to integrating traditionally male institutions, including the construction
of gender in the workplace. 146 Sociologists and gender theorists have shifted
their focus from gender-role stereotyping as a means of gender discrimination to analyzing the institutional and social practices within institutions that
construct gender to exclude women and perpetuate gender segregation in
the labor force. 147 This literature offers the type of particularized understanding of gender as a social process of distinction and exclusion that is
necessary to persuade courts to move beyond discrimination as mere stereotyping.
Pierre Bourdieu, for example, argues that institutions create and maintain socially significant differences between men and women, differences
48
that naturalize gender inequality within the institution and society.
Bourdieu argues that these differences are not merely created through ideological systems of meaning. 149 Rather, they are created and inscribed within
particular social structures, including the workplace, the state, and other
institutions such as the military and the family.' 50 As R.W. Connell explains, "[I]nstitutions are substantively, not just metaphorically, gendered." 151 Social practices map the boundaries of gender within the institution, preserving and enforcing traditional gender roles. 52 Such gendered

144.

In 1999, women comprised 1.9% of firefighters, 4.1% of construction laborers, and 14.2% of

police and detectives. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS FOR
WOMEN IN 1999, available at http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/nontra99.htm (last visited November 9,

2005).
145.
See, e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1687
(1998); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?,49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 772
(1997).
146.
See, e.g., CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER 136-64 (1988); JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 225-30 (1994); R.W. CONNELL,
MASCULINITIES 72-75 (1995).
147.
See, e.g., LORBER, supra note 146.
148.
PIERRE BOuRDIEu, MASCULINE DOMINATION 9 (Richard Nice trans., Stanford Univ. Press
2001) (1998).

149. Id. at 24-25.
150.
Id.
151.
CONNELL, supra note 146, at 73.
152.
See Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Tinkerbells and Pinups: The Construction and Reconstruction of
GenderBoundaries at Work, in CULTIVATING DIFFERENCES: SYMBOLIC BOUNDARIES AND THE MAKING
OF INEQUALITY 232, 238-41 (Michele Lamont & Marcel Fournier eds., 1992).
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practices operate to maintain gender distinctions in the workplace, reinforc53
ing the exclusion of women from traditionally masculine institutions.
Bourdieu refers to such constitutive practices as "rites of institution"
that symbolically highlight sexual distinction. 54 The group harassment of
men who are perceived to be effeminate or homosexual, for example, is1 56a
55
powerful rite that marks "real" men from homosexuals and women.
Rites of institution, Bourdieu argues, test the masculinity of individual
men. 57 Numerous sociologists have documented the prevalence of sexual
harassment in traditionally male workplaces. 58 Practices such as sexual
harassment and rape require men to prove their manhood by denying their
stereotypically feminine qualities, such as compassion or gentleness. 59 Men
who fail these tests or refuse to participate in these rituals are defined as
"wimps," "girlies," and "fairies."' 6
Drawing on similar literature, scholars such as Katherine Franke, Vicki
Schultz, and Kathryn Abrams have focused on the construction of gender
within the workplace, shifting the understanding of discrimination from
stereotyping to the process of gender construction within traditionally male
institutions. Franke, for example, argues that sexual harassment is a "tool or
instrument of gender regulation" to enforce hetero-patriarchal gender norms
in the workplace. 16 In her analysis, Franke focuses on harassment as a
process of gendering in the workplace. 162 Drawing upon postmodern theories of gender, Franke argues that sexual harassment in the workplace construes female workers as feminine women and male workers as masculine
men. 63 She explains that same-sex harassment similarly establishes masculinity in the workplace-those men who are perceived as effeminate are
punished for failing to conform to social norms of masculinity. 164 By focusing on the use of harassment in constructing gender in the workplace,
Franke' s work has provided a theory of the method and harm of harassment.
153.
Id.
154.
BOURDIEU, supra note 148, at 52.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
See, e.g., James E. Gruber, The Impact of Male Work Environments and OrganizationalPolicies
on Women's Experiences of Sexual Harassment, 12 GENDER & SOC'Y 301-20 (1998); Sharon R. Bird,
Welcome to the Men's Club: Homosociality and the Maintenance of Hegemonic Masculinity, 10
GENDER & SOC'Y 120-132 (1996).
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
Franke, supra note 145, at 772.
162.
See id. at 693-94.
163.
Id. at 771-72.
164.
Id. at 693.
If a "technology" is a manner of accomplishing a task, or the specialized aspect of a particular
field, then sexual harassment is both the manner of accomplishing sexist goals, and the specialized instantiation of a sexist ideology. Sexual harassment is a technology of sexism. It is a
disciplinary practice that inscribes, enforces, and polices the identities of both harasser and
victim according to a system of gender norms that envisions women as feminine, (hetero)sexual objects, and men as masculine, (hetero)sexual subjects.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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Similarly, Vicki Schultz has offered a particularized account of how
harassment of women in the workplace functions to preserve male control
and exclude women. In her article Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment,
Professor Schultz argues persuasively that sexual harassment serves a regulatory function by policing the boundaries between men and women, punishing those women who transgress gender norms. 165 Schultz analyzes the
ways in which sexual harassment performs this function. In its myriad
forms, sexual harassment undermines the perceived competence of women
in the workplace, reinforcing the definition and identity of certain jobs as
masculine.' 66 Sexual harassment highlights and exaggerates gender difference in the workplace, reminding women that they are out of place in what
traditionally has been a "man's world."' 167 To the extent that sexual harassment functions to force women out of traditionally male jobs, it operates to
reinforce the definition of the job as male, preserve traditionally male occupations "as bastions of masculine168competence and authority," and preserve
sex segregation in the workplace.
By policing the boundaries of gender in the workplace, Professor
Schultz argues that harassment preserves the masculinity of work that has
been traditionally performed by men. 169 Throughout the article, she draws
upon the actual experiences of women and men negotiating gender in traditionally male workplaces. 70 She quotes a female pipe fitter who explains:
You see it is just very hard for them to work with me because
they're really into proving their masculinity . . . . And when a
woman comes on a job that can work, get something done as fast
and efficiently, as well, as they can, it really affects them. Somehow
171
if a woman can do it, it ain't that masculine, not that tough.
Several courts have cited the scholarship of Franke and Schultz in decisions finding a hostile work environment in traditionally male institutions. 172 For example, the Second Circuit in Dawson v. County of Westchester173 cited the work of Schultz to support its finding that letters from
male corrections officers to a female coworker constituted a hostile work
environment. 174 The Court held that the issue was whether the workplace
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Schultz, supra note 145, at 1687.
Id.
Id. at 1760.
Id. at 1687.
Id. at 1691 (quoting JEAN RE1TH SCHROEDEL, ALONE IN A CROWD: WOMEN IN THE TRADES

TELL THEIR STORIES 20-21 (1985)).

170.
See id. at 1694-95, 1706-10, 1722-29.
171.
Id. at 1691.
172.
See, e.g., Dawson v. County of Westchester, 373 F.3d 265, 274 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Rene v.
MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1069 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) ("All-male workplaces are common
sites for the policing of gender norms and the harassment of men who transgress such norms."); Gregory
v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687, 695 (2d Cir. 2001).
173.
Dawson, 373 F.3d 265.
174.
Id. at 274.
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atmosphere, considered as a whole, "undermined plaintiffs' ability to perjobs, compromising their status as equals to men in the workform their
175
place."'
In Ocheltree v. Scollon Productions,Inc. ,176 Judge Blane Michael relied
on the analysis of both Schultz and Franke in his dissent from the panel
majority opinion that ordered the entry of judgment as a matter of law for
the employer after a jury awarded a female plaintiff damages for sexual
harassment in her lawsuit against Scollon Productions, a predominantly
male workplace. 177 Citing Schultz and Franke, Judge Michael held that the
alleged acts, which included graphic discussions of oral sex and simulated
intercourse with a mannequin, constituted sexual harassment "because they
express and reinforce a regime of gender hierarchy in which men are por178
trayed as sexual subjects while women are portrayed as sexual objects."'
Judge Michael concluded that "[w]hen a workplace is suffused with representations of women as sexual objects, a woman in that workplace would
doubtless wonder whether the primary questions about her in the minds of
her coworkers involved such matters as whether she 'swallows' or whether
she could 'suck a golf ball through a garden hose."' 179 The Fourth Circuit,
holding that the plaintiff stated
sitting en banc, later reversed the dismissal,
0
a claim for actionable harassment.18
As Dawson and Ocheltree illustrate, litigation strategies that draw upon
sociological theories of gender can enrich the courts' understanding of gender discrimination beyond stereotyping. In both cases, the courts focused on
harassment as a mechanism of exclusion as well as a means of subordination. As these cases demonstrate, reconceptualizing gender as a social practice or process that operates within institutions can help persuade courts to
broaden their analysis of gender discrimination beyond a classification error
and to consider the concrete ways in which institutions themselves construct
the ideal worker or workplace as male and masculine-excluding women in
the process.181 Rather than explain the exclusion of women as a violation of
anti-classification principles, legal theories that expose the concrete ways
that workplaces are gendered allow courts to understand how institutions
policies,
operate to exclude women, not merely with formal employment
182
but also by constructing worker roles as male and masculine.

Id.
175.
308 F.3d 351, rev'd en banc, 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2002).
176.
Id. at 374-75 (Michael, J., dissenting).
177.
Id. at 374.
178.
179.
Id. at 375.
Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) (reinstating jury verdict for
180.
plaintiff but denying punitive damages).
See Vojdik, supra note 20, at 85.
181.
See id. at 120.
182.
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III. A CASE STUDY: FRAMING THE MILITARY'S BAN ON WOMEN IN
COMBAT AS SUBORDINATION
The Supreme Court has never considered the constitutionality of the
combat exclusion. In Rostker v. Goldberg,183 the Court held in 1981 that the
exclusion of women from Selective Service registration did not violate the
right to equal protection guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. 184 Because the male plaintiffs did not challenge the combat
exclusion, the Court did not review its constitutionality.185 The Court concluded that the male-only registration was substantially related to the government's purpose in mobilizing troops for combat duty, finding that Congress decided to register only men because women were ineligible for combat. 86 Males and females, the Court held, were not similarly situated
with
87
respect to registration because women were ineligible for combat.
In its decision, the Court cited the 1980 Senate Report on the matter,
concluding that women should not be subject to registration. 88 Specifically,
the Court relied upon the Report's statement that "[t]he principle that
women should not intentionally and routinely engage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys wide support among our people."' 89 Because the question of whether women should be registered for the draft was subject to
wide-ranging public and Congressional debate, the Court concluded that the
decision was not the "accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking
about females."1 90
Since Rostker was decided, the factual and legal assumptions underlying the Court's reasoning no longer apply. Over the past twenty years, the
percentage of women in the military has increased dramatically from 5% in
1979 to approximately 15% in 2005.191 While Rostker assumed that women
would not be necessary in wartime, that is no longer the case. 92 Following
the first Gulf War, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney stated, "We could not
have won [the war] without [women].' 9 3
While the categorical exclusion of women from direct ground combat
appears to be a textbook case of stereotyping under Virginia,'94 many feminists have either failed to advocate or have opposed a constitutional challenge to the exclusion of women from direct combat. 95 Historically, femi183.
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
184.
Id. at 78-79.
185.
Id. at 63.
186.
Id. at 77.
187.
Id. at 77-78.
188.
Id. at 77 (citing S.REP. NO. 96-826, at 157 (1980)).
189.
Id.
190.
Id. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977)).
191.
Jodi Wilgoren, A Nation at War: Women in the Military; A New War Brings New Role for
Women, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at B1.
192.
Rostker, 453 U.S. at 83.
193.
HOLM, infra note 202, at 470.
194.
See, e.g., Blythe Leszkay, Feminism on the Frontlines, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 133 (2003).
195.
See, e.g., Diane H. Mazur, A Call to Arms, 22 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 62 (1999) (criticizing
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nists have disagreed about whether women should participate in combat.' 96
Some feminists are opposed to the military and war and believe that feminists should seek to dismantle the military, or at a minimum should not insist that women be trained to kill in war. 197 Other feminist scholars consider
the legal issue of women in combat to be rooted in outdated notions of liberal feminism and formal equality, both of which limit gender equality98to
instances in which women can prove that they are no different than men.
Neither of these views is particularly persuasive. As a practical matter,
female troops are presently engaged in what historically has been considered combat. 99 While the military's arguments can be characterized as improper stereotypes about the abilities and appropriate roles for women, they
can also be seen as part and parcel of a system of gender subordination
within the military as an institution. Reframed in this way, a legal challenge
to the combat exclusion offers the opportunity to shift the Court's attention
from stereotyping as a cognitive mistake to the institutional practices that
construct the military as male and masculine, stigmatizing and demeaning
women in the process.
The military's policy of excluding women from direct combat, as I argue below, rests not only on traditional gender stereotypes, but also upon
hostility toward women and a desire to preserve the institution as exclusively male and masculine. In Part lI.A, I offer a brief history of the resistance to women in combat. In Part III.B, I analyze the direct combat exclusion as impermissible gender stereotyping and briefly discuss the military's
likely response that its personnel policies are entitled to judicial deference.

legal feminists' avoidance of the issue of women in the military).
196.
See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 866-67 (1990)
("Feminists disagree ... about whether women should be subject to a military draft."); Hirshman, infra
note 197, at 990 ("We ask whether feminists should press for the inclusion of women in mandatory
military service and why ....");Littleton, infra note 197, at 1328 n.256 ("Feminists are as deeply divided in their responses to this issue [employment in the armed services] as they are with regard to
separate pregnancy leave."); Williams, infra note 197, at 163 ("As for Rostker v. Goldberg, the conflicts
among feminists were overtly expressed.").
197.
See, e.g., Linda R. Hirshman, The Book of "A," 70 TEx. L. REv. 971, 993-94 (1992) (describing
the feminist opposition prior to Rostker, 453 U.S. 57, as the "alienationist position . .. that women
should reject the draft as part of a fundamental critique of American foreign and domestic policy and
'reject the war reflex as an instance of male hysteria; in its essence, feminism opposed to violence."'
(quoting A Feminist Opposition to the Draft (authors unidentified), collected in Catharine MacKinnon's
unpublished materials for a course taught at the Stanford Law School, Fall 1980, and reported in Wendy
W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 151 (1992))). Christine Littleton summarized feminist opposition to women in combat as follows:
"On the one hand, the current institution of combat is the apotheosis of phallocentrism, a nonstop program of hierarchy, barely controlled aggression, and alienation.... Perhaps we should be grateful to be
excluded and spend our energy working to get the men excluded, too." Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1328 n.256 (1987). For a discussion of feminist antimilitarism,

see
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ANTIMILITARISTS 19-27 (2000) (explaining that feminist antimilitarists oppose the "masculinist construction of militarism" in society and the violence and destruction that it causes).
198.
See, e.g., supra note 6.
199.
See, e.g., Dave Moniz, Female Amputees Make Clear That All Troops are on Front Lines;
Reality in Iraq has Overtaken Long-Running Debate at Home, USA TODAY, Apr. 28, 2005, at Al.
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In Part llI.C, I reframe the combat exclusion to reveal the institutional practices that subordinate women as different and inferior to men.
A. The History of Resistance to Women's Role in Combat
The history of women in the military reveals the institutional resistance
to integrating women into this powerful male preserve. For women, the
doors have been reluctantly "pried open ''2°° largely as a result of the need
for more troops during times of war and following the adoption of an allvolunteer force. 2 0 As the discussion below demonstrates, the military's
exclusion of women has been based upon unfounded stereotypes and myths
about women's supposed abilities, as well as traditional moral judgments
that a woman's place is not at war. 202 Throughout, the military has redrawn
of combat to perpetuate the myth that women are not in comthe 20
definition
3
bat.
During World War I, approximately 34,000 women served in the war.2°
As many as 21,400 of them served in the Army and Navy Nurse Corps.2 °5 In
World War II, the United States turned to women as a temporary source of
military support and created the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC)
2 °6
and Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES).
Some 350,000 women served in nursing and administrative positions, as
well as all other types of non-combat service. 20 7 After the end of World War
II,
however, Congress passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act
of 1948 (Act), which severely limited women's role in the military.20 8 The
Act capped the number of women in the military to 2% of all enlisted
troops.2 It barred women from serving on aircraft or ships engaged in
combat missions.21 0 In addition, the Act also barred women from serving in
a command position; women could not hold the rank of general or hold
permanent rank above lieutenant colonel. 21 ' Although the Act did not specifically ban female Army soldiers from combat, the Army issued its own
policy of excluding women from direct combat.21 2

200.

MARGARET C. HARRELL ET AL., THE STATUS OF GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE MILITARY 2

(2002).
201.
As experts point out, "In times of national emergency, traditional restrictions on gender roles
tend to be eased." Kim Field & John Nagl, Combat Rules for Women: A Modest Proposal, 31
PARAMETERS 74, 75 (2001).
JEANNE HOLM, WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 337-45 (rev. ed.
202.

1992).
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See, e.g., id. at 337-38.
Id. at 10.
Id.
id. at 21-27.
Id. at 100-01.
Id. at 113, 119-27.
Id. at 120-22.
Id. at 120, 126-27.
Id. at 120, 122-23.
Id. at 126-27.
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Nearly twenty years later, Congress repealed the 2% cap and some limits on promotion in 1967, paving the way for the increased participation of
women during the Vietnam War.21 3 The ban on women in ROTC was
eliminated in 1972, al4 and in 1976, the federal service academies began to
admit women. a 5 Military commanders and the commandants of the academies, however, strongly opposed the admission of women.21 6 The Superintendent of West Point, General William Westmoreland, argued that "maybe
you could find one woman in 10,000 who could lead in combat, but she
would be a freak and we're not running the military academy for freaks. 2 17
In 1979, Congress considered requiring women to participate in Selective Service registration.1 8 In Senate hearings, military leaders testified
21 9
against the registration of females and the repeal of the combat exclusion.
The Senate Committee on Armed Services issued a report in 1980 in which
it rejected registering women for the draft. The Committee reasoned that
historically, women had not regularly participated in combat and no society
had conscripted women for combat roles. 220 The Committee cited "important societal reasons" for preserving an all-male registration, including the
"sweeping implications" for society should young mothers be drafted and
leave their children with their young fathers. 22 1 The Committee concluded
that women lack the physical and emotional strength to kill and fight in battle; their presence would result in sexual tension, pregnancy, and perceptions of unfairness; and women would impair the male bonding and unit
cohesion necessary for military effectiveness. 2 Although the country was
no longer at war, the Senate Committee warned that assigning women to
combat positions "would leave the actual performance of sexually mixed
units as an experiment to be conducted in war with unknown 223
risk-a risk
that the committee finds militarily unwarranted and dangerous.
In 1981, the United States Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of
women from Selective Service registration in Rostker, holding that because

213.

Id. at 192-202 (discussing the enactment of Act of Nov. 8, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-130, 81 Stat.

374 (codified in various parts of 10 U.S.C.)).
214.

Id. at 167-70.

215.

Id. at 305-12 (discussing the enactment of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authoriza-

tion Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-106, 89 Stat 531 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 4342 (2000)) and the integra-

tion of women into the military academies).
216.
Id. at 307-08.
217.
David Lamb, A Conversation on . . . General Principles; William Westmoreland Reflects on
America's Recent Wars, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1991, at El.

218.

HOLM, supra note 202, at 350; see SELECTIVE SERV. SYS., BACKGROUNDER: WOMEN AND THE

DRAFT IN AMERICA (1998),.
219.
LINDA BIRD FRANCKE, GROUND ZERO: THE GENDER WARS IN THE MILITARY 22-23 (1997).

220.
Id. at 149.
221.
Id. at 159. The Report stated, "Moreover, the committee feels that any attempt to assign women
to combat positions could affect the national resolve at the time of mobilization, a time of great strain on
all aspects of the Nation's resources." Id. at 157.
222.
Id. at 157.
223.
Id.
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women were ineligible for combat, their exclusion was substantially related
to the need to raise combat troops.224
Following the end of the Vietnam War, the Department of Defense had
adopted a definition of combat that applied broadly to cover the participation of women in World War H, Korea, and Vietnam. The definition provided:
The term "combat" refers to "engaging an enemy or being engaged
by an enemy in armed conflict." Under currentpractices,a person
is considered to be "in combat" when he or she is in a geographic
area designated as a combat/hostile fire zone by the Secretary of
Defense.... These definitions apply to men and women of all the
services. 225
Moreover, the definition explicitly acknowledged that "[w]omen have
served in combat in many skills during World War I, Korea, and Vietnam., 226 The definition stated that "[w]omen have received hostile fire pay
and combat awards in past conflicts"-both of which are authorized only if
a service member has engaged in combat.227
In 1988, the Department of Defense scrapped its broad definition of
combat and replaced it with the "Risk Rule" that redefined combat to bar
women from serving in units with a high probability of engaging in combat. Under the 1988 Risk Rule, Congress narrowed the definition of combat to exclude women's historical participation in warfare. 229 The new rule
defined combat as:
[E]ngaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew-served
weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel. Direct combat [normally] takes place well forward on the battlefield
while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire,
maneuver, or shock effect.23 °
The definition of combat under the Risk Rule substantially alters the
traditional notion of combat duty. Under the definition, thousands of soldiers in World War II would find themselves not in combat, a result plainly
opposite the common understanding of war. Moreover, the Risk Rule expressly excluded women from serving in combat units as well as "non224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
TIMES,

Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 77 (1981).
HOLM, supra note 202, at 338 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 433.
Id.
Rowan Scarborough, Female Soldiers Eyed For Combat; Army Seeks End of 1994 Ban, WASH.
Oct. 22, 2004, at A l (quoting the new combat definition).
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combat units or missions if the risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile
fire, or capture are equal to or greater than the risk in the combat units they
support., 231 Each service made its own evaluation as to "whether a noncombat position should be open or closed to women.' 232
The first Gulf War in 1991 marked a major turning point for women's
military participation. The United States deployed more than 40,000 female
troops during Operation Desert Storm, approximately 10% of all deployed
troops. 233 Female troops served in key combat-support positions throughout
the Gulf, performing in medical and administrative jobs, as well as nontraditional assignments, including airlifting supplies and personnel, maintaining weapons systems, and serving as intelligence specialists.234 Females
served as fighter pilots, weapons inspectors, and supply company members.235
The Gulf War blurred the distinction between direct and indirect combat
embodied in the Risk Rule. Operation Desert Storm had no "frontline. ''236 It
was fought on a non-linear battleground in which Iraqi troops engaged U.S.
combat and support forces. 237 As a result, dozens of female troops engaged
in combat with Iraqi troops-twenty-three female Marines received the
Combat Action Ribbon.238 Thirteen women were killed in the line of duty;
two females were taken as prisoners of war. 239 One of the female POWs,
Major Rhonda Cornum, was on a search-and-rescue mission when the Army
helicopter in which she was flying was shot down in southeastern Iraq.2 4
Major Cornum suffered two broken arms, had a bullet enter her right shoulder, and injured her knee seriously. 24' Cornum's commanders agreed that
her presence did not hurt the unit's performance; specifically, Lieutenant
Colonel Bryan wrote in his Officer Evaluation Report of Cornum's performance:
Outstanding performance in combat. Rhonda Comum is the finest aviation medical officer in the Army. She is a tough, nononsense officer who has demonstrated magnificent technical skill
combined with outstanding leadership. Rhonda has the most profound impact on the combat effectiveness of my battalion. Rhonda
231.
David F. Burrelli, Women in the Armed Forces, CRS ISSUE BRIEF, Dec. 12, 1996,
http://www.fas.org/man/crs/92-008.htm.
232.
GENDER ISSUES, supra note 17, at 2.
233.
Leela Jacinto, Girl Power, Women Join the Boys in Combat, But Not Without a Fight, ABC
NEWS.COM, Jan. 14, 2003, http://www.opportunity.wpafb.af.miUIMAR%2003%20ADVISOR/Mar%

2003%2ONews%20Articles/ABCNEWScom%20%2OThe%2OCost%20of%20Women%20in%20Comb
at.htm.
234.
See id.
235.
See id.
236.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 19, at 93 (dissenting to the retention of the DOD risk rule).
237.
Id. at 94.
238.
Id.
239.
Id.
240.
HOLM, supra note 202, at 458.
241.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 19, at iii.
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She
Cornum makes things happen. People follow her anywhere.
242
goes where soldiers need her. A true ultimate warrior.
The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the
Armed Services reported in 1993 that the women who served in the Persian
Gulf War "met the highest standards of military professionalism during a
watershed period in our nation's history. 24 3 Like male soldiers, female soldiers faced hostile fire; flew into enemy territory; suffered death, injury, and
confinement as prisoners of war; lived in conditions of extreme hardship;
and performed tasks requiring physical strength and stamina.244
After the end of the Gulf War, given the outstanding contribution of
female troops to the war, a number of legislators sought to abolish the statutory restrictions on women in combat.245 The House Armed Services Committee conducted hearings in 1991 to consider repealing the statutory restrictions on women in combat. 246 Each of the members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff testified against allowing women in combat.2 47 Army Chief General
Carl E. Vuono and Marine Commandant General Alfred M. Gray, Jr., adamantly opposed allowing women in ground combat, claiming that it would
reduce military effectiveness because "women [lack the] physical strength
,,248
or stamina and that their presence would distract [the] male soldiers.
Officers of the various services testified as well, both for and against expanding women's roles in combat. 249 No senior female officer, nor any expert who had researched women's performance in the armed services, was
asked to testify.25 °
Over the opposition of military leaders, Congress, in 1991 and 1993, repealed the statutory prohibitions against the assignment of women to combat aircraft and naval ships. 251 The National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1994 also required the Secretary of Defense (1) to ensure that
qualification for occupational career fields is evaluated on the basis of a
common, relevant performance standard and not on the basis of gender; (2)
to refrain from the use of gender quotas, goals, or ceilings, except as specifically authorized by Congress; and (3) to refrain from changing occupational standards to increase or decrease the number of women in an occupa-

242.
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105 Stat. 1290, 1365-70 (1991); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-160, § 541, 107 Stat. 1547, 1659 (1993).
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tional career field. 2 In November 1993, Congress
repealed the statutory
253
exclusion of women from naval combat ships.
The DOD, in 1994, rescinded the Risk Rule, expanding the opportunities for women in combat. 254 Because combat and non-combat support units
in Desert Storm were both at risk, DOD concluded that the Risk Rule was
no longer appropriate. 255 The DOD issued a new direct ground combat assignment rule that required that all service members be assigned to all posts
for which they qualify. 256 The rule, however, "excludes women from assignment below the brigade level whose primary mission is direct ground
combat., 257 "Brigades are ground combat units of [approximately] 3,000 to
5,000 soldiers whose primary mission is to close with and destroy enemy
forces. 258 In addition, services also may close positions to women if:
(1) the[ir] units and positions are required to physically collocate
and remain with direct ground combat units, (2) the service Secretary attests that the cost of providing appropriate living arrangements for women is prohibitive, (3) the units are engaged in special
operations forces' missions or long-range reconnaissance, or (4) job
related physical requirements [that would mandate exclusion] .259
The Secretary of the Army, Togo West, explained that the expansion of
professional roles for women in the Army
not only mirrors changes in our society-but more importantly it reflects changes in the conduct of war, which has evolved from a contest of strength of individual combatants, to a contest in which a far
wider variety of skills contribute to victory. The nature of the modem battlefield is such that we can expect soldiers throughout the
breadth and depth of a theater of war to be potentially in combat.26 °
At the time DOD adopted the 1994 direct ground combat exclusion, it
issued a written report stating that it did not consider changing the longstanding exclusion of women from direct ground combat because DOD
officials believed the change lacked public and Congressional support.261
Presumably, the report represented the official reasoning of DOD on this
252.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, §§ 542-43.
253.
Id. § 541.
254.
GENDER ISSUES, supra note 17, at 2.
255.
Id.
256.
Id. at 2-3.
257.
Id. at 3.
258.
Id. at 3 n.3.
259.
Id. at 3.
260.
Brief for Lieutenant Colonel Rhonda Comum et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7,
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941) (quoting Memorandum from Togo West,
Sec. of the Army, on Increasing Opportunities for Women in the Army (July 27, 1994)).
261.
GENDER ISSUES, supra note 17, at 4.
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issue. At a press conference, DOD officials also stated "that the assignment
of women to direct ground combat units 'would not contribute to the readiness and effectiveness of those units"' because women lacked the physical
strength and stamina necessary for the job.262
The repeal of the statutory bans on women in combat opened many positions to women. However, the continued exclusion of women from direct
ground combat bars women from one out of five military positions.263 In the
Army, one-third of officer assignments are closed to women, including infantry, armor, cannon field artillery, short-range air defense artillery, and
special forces. 264 These positions are considered to be of greatest significance to the defense mission, both in terms of their function and cultural
significance. 265 They are also the most valuable routes to promotion to high
command positions. 266 As a result, the division of labor in the military is
highly gender-oriented.26 7 Female troops are concentrated in low ranks and
pay grades.

268

For example, two-thirds occupy traditionally female jobs in

administration, health care, communications, and service/supply occupations.2 69
During the past two years, the United States has deployed tens of thousands of female troops to serve in the war against Iraq and Afghanistan.27 °
Women currently comprise one of every seven troops in Iraq, serving as
fighter pilots, military police, weapons inspectors, and supply company
members. 27' The United States' war on Iraq is being fought as a guerilla war
without a front line, blurring the distinction between direct and indirect
combat.2 72 Female pilots have flown combat missions under enemy fire in
Black Hawk helicopters, Stealth bombers, and F18 fighter jets.273 As of
January 2005, thirty-eight female troops have been killed, most of them in
hostile action.274 In addition, two soldiers, Jessica Lynch and Shoshana
262.
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the combat support areas.") (quoting Carol Mutter, chairwoman of the Defense Advisory Committee on
Women in Service).
Jeanette Steele, Revolution in Jet FighterScene, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 30, 2003, at B 1.
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Marine Captain Amy McGrath and Captain Jaden Kim, Homet weapon systems officers in Marine
Fighter Attack Squadron 121, flew combat missions in Iraq, including bombing runs, forward air control,
and reconnaissance, during which their planes took enemy fire. Id. In Afghanistan, they flew over sixty
sorties in thirty days. Id. Air Force Captain Kim Reed Campbell flew combat missions in Iraq, coming
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Johnson, were captured and held as prisoners of war by Iraqi troops.275 Over
200 female soldiers have been either wounded or permanently disabled.276
Underscoring the importance of female troops, the Army announced its
decision to add female soldiers in January 2005 to newly created "forward
support companies" in the Third Infantry Division in Iraq.27 These support
units will be attached to infantry, armor, and Special Forces units whose
27 8
mission is to engage in direct combat, placing women on the front line.
The Army conceded that female troops were necessary because there are too
few qualified males to fill these positions and to provide adequate support to
combat troops.2 79 In response, in May, 2005, the House Armed Services
Committee approved legislation to require the Army to prohibit women
from serving in any company-size unit that provides support to combat battalions.28 ° Supporters of the legislation sought to prohibit the Army from
assigning females to forward support companies.281 Military leaders
strongly opposed the legislation, however, stating the women were performing "magnificently" in battlefields without any clear front lines.2 2 In the
face of DOD's opposition, the supporters of the legislation were forced to
withdraw their proposal.2 83
B. Framingthe Constitutional Wrong As Gender Stereotyping
Under Virginia, a constitutional challenge to DOD's direct ground
combat exclusion could be framed as a straightforward case of impermissible stereotyping. To justify the exclusion of women from direct ground
combat, the military has relied upon outdated generalizations and stereotypes that women lack the physical, temperamental, cognitive, and behavioral traits necessary for combat.2 84 While opponents concede that some
women are just as strong, aggressive, and able to perform well in combat,
they nevertheless argue that the real question is not whether women are
capable of being soldiers but "femaleness qua femaleness. 2 85 Introducing
even qualified females to all-male combat units, opponents have argued,
will disrupt unit cohesion, reduce the willingness of men to risk their lives,
and make the military less attractive to potential male recruits.2
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Within the anti-classification framework, the military's arguments cannot satisfy the Virginia requirement of an "exceedingly persuasive" justification that is necessary to uphold a gender-based classification.287 The arguments against women in combat are not based upon empirical evidence
from studies of the performance of female troops in the Gulf War or other
conflicts, but upon anecdotal evidence, personal opinion, and studies allegedly finding gender differences in non-military contexts.2 88 Moreover, there
is ample evidence that the combat exclusion does not reflect studied analysis of women's actual combat performance, but instead rests upon overly
broad stereotypes and traditional normative judgments about women's role
in society. 289
The 1980 report by the Senate Committee on Armed Services, cited by
the Supreme Court in Rostker, reflects and incorporates traditional gender
stereotypes and norms. The findings of the Committee regarding women's
alleged unsuitability for combat (e.g. women are not physically fit for combat, will destroy unit cohesion, etc.) are precisely the type of overly broad
generalizations that the Supreme Court rejected in Virginia. The Committee
report also embodied traditional gender norms, specifically the "fundamental" belief that women should not engage in combat.2 9°
The testimony of military commanders during the 1991 Congressional
hearings on eliminating the combat exclusion is similarly replete with both
descriptive and normative stereotypes about women. For example, General
Merrill A. McPeak, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, testified that he opposed combat roles for women because of his normative belief that women
do not belong in combat. 291 General McPeak explained, "[I] took great
comfort in [the combat exclusion] when it was on the books because [1]
couldn't think of a logical reason, a logical argument, for defending a policy
of excluding women from combat assignments. [I] didn't want to have to sit
down and write out such a policy over there on the fourth floor of the Pentagon. 292
McPeak admitted that his opposition to women in combat was based on
his traditional normative views about the proper role of women, for example, that women should not kill:
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House Hearings] (statement of General Merrill A. McPeak, United States Air Force).
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I still think it is not a good idea for me to have to order women into
combat. Combat is about killing people; and I am afraid that even
though logic tells us that women can do that as well as men, I have
a very traditionalattitude about wives and mothers and daughters
being orderedto kill people.293
When asked what he would do if he had to choose between a qualified
female and a less-qualified male to fill a combat role, General McPeak testified that he would select the male for reasons that were not rational. 294 "I
admit, it does not make much sense, but that is the way I feel about it," he
explained.29 5
General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, similarly testified during the 1992 House hearings:
But when you get right down to it, as General McPeak just said,
"combat" is killing. "Combat" in the sense that we usually associate
with the direct combat role is looking another human being in the
eye and killing him. It is not a pleasant job. It is not done with a
precision-guided munition in all cases. Sometimes, it is done with
your hands. It is done with a shovel. It is done at close range. It is
not good. It is debasing.
It is something that I would not want to see women involved in
and for which I do not believe-and I am grateful that this is my
perception-that women are suited to do.296
Former Marine Commandant General Robert H. Barrow testified with
emotion that women's "very nature" disqualifies them from engaging in
combat:
Combat is finding and closing with and killing or capturing the
enemy. It is killing, that is what it is.
And it is done in an environment that is often as difficult as you
can possibly imagine-extremes of climate, brutality, deaths, dying.
It is uncivilized, and women cannot do it. Nor should they be even
thought of as doing it. The requirements for strength and endurance
renders them unable to do it.

293.
Id. (emphasis added).
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And I may be old fashioned, but I think the very nature of
women disqualifies them from doing
it. Women give life, sustain
29 7
it.
take
not
do
they
life,
nurture
life,
Much of the testimony of male officers at the 1991 Senate hearings did
not focus on particular instances where women interfered with military effectiveness, but rather reflected their own personal reluctance to work with
female troops on an equal basis in combat. For example, a male Air Force
pilot testified, "I guess I'm old-fashioned in my values, but I cannot see
myself running around in my flight of four, doing the town in Song Tong
City, if one of them was a girl .... I think it would affect the effectiveness
of my flight squadron., 298 Putting women in ground combat, General Barrow testified, would "destroy the Marine Corps... something no enemy has
been able to do in over 200 years. 2 99
Much of legal scholarship that has analyzed the constitutionality of the
combat exclusion discusses the empirical evidence that challenges the military's reliance upon overly broad stereotypes about the abilities of women
and their supposed effect on military effectiveness. 300 There is ample literature documenting the fact that the physical differences between men and
women are overstated; 30 1 that with new modem technology, combat no
longer requires the same type of physical strength as in past wars; 30 2 that
female troops in forward units during the first Gulf War earned the respect
of their male peers; 3°3 and that women do not detract greatly from military
readiness, cohesion, and morale. 3°
Opponents of women in combat concede that some women are physically qualified to participate in combat. They argue, however, that their
presence will undermine male bonding and unit cohesion, undermining
military effectiveness. With respect to this argument that women will impede male bonding and unit cohesion, studies have failed to demonstrate
297.
Senate Hearings,supra note 294, at 895 (statements of General Robert H. Barrow, United States
Marine Corps (Retired)) (emphasis added).
298.
FRANcKE, supra note 219, at 248 (quoting the testimony of Captain David Freeney to the
PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N, supra note 19).
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As the Persian Gulf conflict emphatically demonstrated, warfare has evolved into a highly
technical and long range endeavor. In most cases, the formerly paramount attribute of overpowering physical strength needed by the warriors of yore has been replaced in importance
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that the integration of women into combat units negatively affects unit cohesion or military readiness. 30 5 As a threshold issue, it is important to define
exactly what is meant by "unit cohesion." Scholars distinguish social cohesion from task cohesion: Social cohesion refers to group members who like
each other, while task cohesion refers to the ability of a small group to work
together. 30 6 Even assuming that the introduction of members who are different affects the social cohesion of a group, task cohesion is not affected.30 7
As Joshua Goldstein points out, "The members may not like each other as
much if they feel they do not have values and experiences in common, but
they still work together well because of discipline and leadership within a
military organization. ' ,30 8 Moreover, the notion that women would destroy
unit cohesion ignores that combat itself creates cohesiveness because group
survival depends on teamwork. 3°
Numerous studies by the military and others have found that gender integration does not adversely affect bonding among troops. The U.S. Army
has conducted various studies of gender-integrated training and field exercises and concluded that unit cohesion was not affected. 310 As one report
concluded, "it is the commonality of experience of the soldiers involved,
rather than their gender, that produces cohesion., 311 Another report by the
General Accounting Office in 1996 found that gender-integrated basic training does not adversely affect the performance of trainees.312 A 1997 RAND
study found that gender by itself did not result in any decline in unit cohesiveness or military effectiveness.3 13 Military leadership, on the other hand,
was a significant variable that affected both.314
Even assuming that the military's generalizations are true, under United
States v. Virginia, the military cannot categorically exclude from combat
those women who are qualified based upon these overly broad generalizations about women's abilities or traditional gender norms that women
should be in the home, not in war. 315 The argument that women will impede
male bonding and unit cohesion is the same argument rejected by the Court
305.
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in Virginia as a doomsday prediction used throughout history to keep
women out of all-male institutions.1 6
In response, the military undoubtedly would argue that Virginia does
not apply because VMI is a state college, not a military institution or federal
service academy. Unlike decisions made by a state college, the decision
whether women should engage in direct combat arguably is a decision made
by the Department of Defense involving national security. The Supreme
Court traditionally has afforded the military great deference in decisions
related to the protection of national security, which it has broadly defined.3 17
Federal courts have routinely deferred to military judgments about appropriate behavior and conduct of uniformed personnel, especially where the
United States invokes claims of national security. In Goldman v. Weinberger,31 8 for example, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Army's
ban on service members wearing yarmulkes while on duty.319 While acknowledging that the regulation infringed on the free exercise right of Jewish service members, the Court deferred to the military's judgment that the
dress code was necessary to maintain order and discipline.
In upholding the ban on yarmulkes and other military regulations,
courts explicitly have recognized the military's asserted need for uniformity
and cohesion within the armed services. 321 The Court in Goldman found that
the "essence of military service 'is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the [military] service. 3 22 Rather
than tolerate individuality, the military "must foster instinctive obedience,
unity, commitment, and esprit de corps. 323 These arguments may be particularly persuasive during times of war, when concern for national safety is
especially high.
As courts have recognized, however, the doctrine of judicial deference
does not mean that federal courts lack the power to review military policies
that allegedly violate constitutional rights.324 In Goldman, the petitioner did
not contend that the military sought to categorically exclude Jewish service
members.32 5 In contrast, the direct ground combat exclusion is a deliberate
choice to categorically exclude qualified women from combat positions
based upon stereotypical beliefs about women's abilities and roles, which
has been routinely rejected by the Court. Under the standard of skeptical
scrutiny applicable to gender classifications, a court may not simply defer to
316.
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317.
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322.
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military judgment-particularly where such judgment is based upon traditional gender norms and stereotypes consistently rejected by the Supreme
Court. This applies with special force where, as demonstrated below, the
military's exclusionary policy is not based simply upon mistakes in judgment as to the abilities of women, but is based upon and reinforces institutionalized hostility and animus toward women in the military.
The arguments raised by opponents of women in ground combat are
similar to those raised against the integration of black and white troops. In
World War II, the United States allowed a small number of AfricanAmerican men to serve in combat, but only in separate, all-black units.326
Like the general public, the military command was deeply opposed to the
integration of blacks, relying on degrading racial stereotypes that blacks
lacked the cognitive, emotional, and moral ability to be effective soldiers
and leaders.327 Secretary of War Henry Stimson and other War Department
officials argued that black troops should be segregated in service support
units. Stimson explained:
Leadership is not imbedded in the Negro race yet and to try to
make commissioned officers to lead the men into battle---colored
men-is to work disaster to both.... [I] hope to Heaven's sake they
won't mix the white and the colored troops together in the same
units for then we shall certainly have trouble.328
Like opponents of women in combat, military commanders warned that
the integration of blacks would destroy unit cohesion and military effectiveness. 329 After the end of World War II, President Truman appointed top
U.S. military leaders to a military panel charged with studying his proposal
to require the military to end the racial segregation of African-American
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men. 330 The military committee appointed to study the proposed racial integration of the Navy in the 1940s reported:
Men on board ship live in particularly close association; in their
messes, one man sits beside another; their hammocks or bunks are
close together; in their common tasks they work side by side; and in
particular tasks such as those of a gun's crew, they form a closely
knit, highly coordinatedteam. How many white men would choose,
of their own accord, that their closest associates in sleeping quarters, at mess, and in a gun's crew should be of another race? How
many would accept such conditions, if requiredto do so, without resentment and just as a matter of course? The General Board believes that the answer is "Few, if any," and further believes that if
the issue were forced, there would be331a lowering of contentment,
teamwork and discipline in the service.
Speaking in support of the exclusion of black troops, Senator Richard
B. Russell offered the same arguments now used to justify the exclusion of
women from combat:
[T]he mandatory intermingling of the races throughout the services
will be a terrific blow to the efficiency and fighting power of the
armed services ....It is sure to increase the numbers of men who
will be disabled through communicable diseases. It will increase the
rate of crime committed by servicemen.3 32
Not surprisingly, the military has made the same argument in support of
its exclusion of homosexual service members. While the appellate courts
that have considered the issue prior to Lawrence v. Texas 33 3 have upheld the
ban, there have been some notable dissents that recognize that the military's
asserted fear for "unit cohesion" is a disguised desire to preserve the military as male and heterosexual.334 In his dissent from the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Thomasson v. Perry, Judge K.K. Hall rejected the military's
claim that gays would erode unit cohesion and destroy military effectiveness, stating: "'Unit cohesion' is a facile way for the ins to put a patina of
rationality on their efforts to exclude the outs. The concept has therefore
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been a favorite of those who, through the years, have resisted the irresistible
erosion of white male domination of the armed forces. 33 5
In the Ninth Circuit's decision in Philips v. Perry,Judge Betty Fletcher
dissented from the majority's decision upholding the military's policy of
"don't ask/don't tell, 336 arguing that the military's ban on homosexuals
failed to meet the rational basis test. 33 In her opinion, she compared the
rationale against homosexuals to the military's historical ban on AfricanAmericans:
As courts and commentators have noted, the "unit cohesion" rationale proffered in support of the "don't ask/don't tell" policy is
disturbingly similar to the arguments used by the military to justify
the exclusion from and segregation of African [-]Americans in military service.... Despite the deference due the military, there is no
doubt that were the government today to exclude AfricanAmericans from the military, the courts would easily reject the military's assertions of "unit cohesion," "morale," and "discipline" and
strike down the policy as violative of equal protection. While racial
classifications are subject to a stricter level of scrutiny, these asserted interests, which are based on animosity towards the disfavored class, are no more acceptable when used to support the exclusion of gay men and lesbians from the military.338
Under Virginia, it is easy to frame the categorical exclusion of women
from combat as impermissible gender stereotyping. To the extent that an
anti-stereotyping approach invites the Court to determine whether the military's judgment reflects overly broad generalizations about women, DOD
can argue that the Court should not second-guess its judgments regarding
personnel, especially in times of war. Because the combat exclusion is
based upon traditional gender stereotypes and norms, courts could refuse to
defer to the military's judgment. A more persuasive approach, however, is
to focus the courts' attention on the combat exclusion as part and parcel of a
system of gender subordination within the military as an institution. As I
argue below, reframing the exclusion makes visible the underlying hostility
and animus toward women and significantly undermines the military's
claim for judicial deference.
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C. Beyond Stereotyping: The Combat Exclusion and the Constructionof
Masculinity Within the Military
Rather than focus solely on the military's stereotypical judgments of
women's abilities, a more persuasive approach would seek to persuade the
courts that the combat exclusion is part and parcel of an institutional system
of gender subordination. Through a range of institutional practices, the military as an institution constructs men and women as fundamentally different,
rationalizing the exclusion of women even when their courage under fire
continues to be demonstrated. 339 The refusal of military leaders to open their
ranks to qualified women does not rest on mistaken judgments about their
capabilities, but upon a deep-seated hostility toward females that is institutionalized through a range of social practices that privilege masculinity and
demean femininity.
As Karst has argued, the combat exclusion operates the same as the historical exclusion of blacks from all-white units, which reinforced the racial
subordination of blacks, and the exclusion of gays from military service. 34°
Like the military's now-discredited policy of racial segregation and its current ban on homosexuals, the categorical exclusion of women from direct
ground combat rests upon invidious social distinctions between the privileged male warriors and the outsiders. Such distinctions create a caste system underlying a social belief that the outside group is inherently different
from, and inferior to, the men who are warriors. 34 1
Kenneth Karst has argued eloquently that the exclusion of women from
combat preserves the ideology of masculinity or "manhood," rationalizing
male access to power.4 2 Karst argues that the combat exclusion "symboliz[es] and reinforce[es] a traditional view of femininity that subordinates
women." 343 The exclusion of women is essential to enforce the bounds of
gender that maintain separate spheres within the military-males as warriors, females as support personnel. 3 "
Masculinity is not merely an ideology or belief, however, but a social
practice within the military that constructs warriors as male and masculine.
As Bourdieu argues, masculinity as a social practice rationalizes the inequality and subordination of women within the military and society.345 Warriors are gendered male and masculine. 346 The military traditionally has

339.
See, e.g., Fenner, supra note 305, at 30.
340.
Karst, supra note 21, at 500.
341.
Madeline Mortis, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture,45 DUKE L.J. 651, 71620(1996).
342.
Karst, supra note 21, at 502-10.
343.
Id. at 525.
344.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 267, at 102-03; Morris, supra note 326, at 718-19.
345.
See Vojdik, supra note 21, at 265 n.41 (citing BOURDIEU, supra note 148, at 8-12).
346.
David J. Morgan, Theater of War: Combat, the Military, and Masculinities, in THEORIZING
MASCULINTIES 165, 165 (Harry Brod & Michael Kaufman eds., 1994) ("Despite far-reaching political,
social, and technological changes, the warrior still seems to be a key symbol of masculinity.").

342

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 57:2:303

considered basic training a "proving ground" for masculinity. 347 Recruiting
slogans for the military have featured slogans such as "The Marine Corps
Builds Men" and "Join the Army and Feel Like a Man." 48 Recruiting advertisements historically have focused on challenging boys to become men.
For example, an advertisement for the Army National Guard in the late
1980s was captioned "[k]iss your momma goodbye" and featured a photograph of a group of men wading through deep water. 349 As recently as 2004,
the Air Force Academy boasted a large sign that read, "Bring Me Men. 35 °
As Goldstein argues in War and Gender, the relationship between gender and war is reciprocal: Warriors are constructed as masculine, and masculinity is constructed through war. 351 According to David Marlowe, the
Chief of Military Psychiatry at the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research,
"[t]he soldier's world is characterized by a stereotypical masculinity. His
language is profane, his professed sexuality crude and direct; his maleness
is his armor,
the measure of his competence, capability, and confidence in
352
himself.,
Through a range of institutional practices, the military constructs masculinity as the opposite of femininity, establishing gender boundaries that
denigrate females and the feminine while privileging males and masculinity. 353 A variety of rituals and practices compel males to prove their social
identity as men through both the symbolic and actual enactments of a hypermasculinity that denigrates women.354 From the beginning, drill sergeants
355
humiliate recruits by calling them "pussies," "sissies," ".girls,"or "fags.''"
Cadence calls, called joadies, often denigrate women or celebrate male sexual domination of women. At the Naval Academy in the late 1980s, the glee
club's favorite tune was "The S&M Man," sung to the tune of "The Candy
Man. 35 6 The first verse went: "Who can take a chain saw/Cut the bitch in
two/Fuck the bottom half/and give the upper half to you. '357 A formal photograph of a Marine platoon whose members graduated from recruit training
347.
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in 1989 shows the men posed with their drill instructors "holding a blownup picture of a naked woman and a hand-lettered sign reading 'kill, rape,
pillage, burn."' 358 In each case, masculinity is defined through its opposition
to, and eradication of, the feminine.
The integration of women into the highly masculinized military culture
fundamentally challenges the constructed identity of the warrior as male and
the military as masculine. 359 As retired Navy Admiral James Webb explains,
the military historically provided a "ritualistic rite of passage into manhood. ' , 360 According to Webb, the integration of women into the military
makes male troops "feel stripped, symbolically and actually. 361 Webb argued that the inclusion of women will disrupt the link between warfare and
masculinity and reduce men's motivation for combat.36 z He stated, "The real
question is this: Where in the country can someone go to find out if he is a
man? And where can someone who knows he is a man go to celebrate his
masculinity?, 363 As Kingley R. Browne explains, "If combat is no' ' longer
a
'manly' pursuit, then failure at it is no longer a failure of manhood. 364
The opposition of those male officers and members of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff who testified against women in combat in Congressional hearings,
illustrates this attitude. Though couched in terms of unit cohesion and effectiveness, their testimony reflects the underlying belief that a warrior is valuable precisely because women cannot do it. As a first sergeant in Special
Operations testified, "[The] warrior mentality will crumble if women are
placed in combat positions .... There needs to be that belief that 'I can do
this because nobody else can.", 365 A female Air Force pilot testified before
the commission that a male in test pilot school told her, "'Look, I can handle anything, but I can't handle being worse than you.,,, 366 Marine Colonel
Ron Ray testified, "Why do these women want to trade the best of what it
means to be a woman, for the worst of what it means to be a man? ' 367 Even
more bluntly, General Westmoreland testified against the repeal of the combat exclusion laws in 1979, stating, "[n]o man with gumption wants a
woman to fight his nation's battles. 368
Because of the fundamental challenge that women pose to the identity
of the warrior as male and masculine, the military has responded to the integration of women through a range of practices that highlight the femininity
of female troops and thereby preserve the boundaries of gender within the
military as an institution. One fascinating example is the military's adoption
358.
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of numerous dress and grooming codes that compelled female cadets and
service members to appear socially feminine.
The Marine Corps responded to the integration of females by preserving
visible distinctions between male and female Marines. The Marine Corps
insisted on calling its females "Women Marines," or "WMs." 369 Other
terms for females used in the Corps were more derogatory, such as "BAMs
370
or Bammies (an acronym for 'Broad-Assed Marines') and Marionettes.,
These terms distinguish females as different from, and inferior to, "real"
Marines, who are male. To further enforce the gender distinction, the Marine Corps required female recruits to wear makeup---at a minimum, lipstick
and eye shadow. 37 1 Female recruits were also required to attend classes on
makeup, hair care, poise, and etiquette.372 The Air Force Academy required
that women's uniforms make apparent the gender distinction between male
and female cadets; female cadets were required to look "feminine. 37 3 At
West Point, the academy initially banned female cadets from wearing skirts
to a school dance, only to reverse itself after observing "'mirror-image couples dancing in short hair and dress gray trousers.' ' 374 West Point also required the first class of female cadets to attend a lecture on make-up application sponsored by Revlon, the cosmetics manufacturer.37 5
By highlighting the gender of female cadets, the military enforced gender distinction within the military. 376 Rather than include women as warriors, the military symbolically separated females from the "real" male warriors, preserving the masculinity of warriors and the hierarchy of gender
within the institution.3 77
The integration of women into the military's hyper-masculine culture
has also resulted in widespread hostility and harassment of those women
who transgress the boundaries of gender. Sexual harassment of military
women is pervasive. According to a 1995 Department of Defense study,
nearly 70% of military women have experienced sexual harassment in their
workplace. An Army senior review panel similarly reported in 1997 that
80% of men and 84% of women in the Army reported experiencing inappropriate harassment such as "crude or offensive actions, sexism, unwanted
sexual attention or more serious problems like assault., 378 The sexual har369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
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Hillman, supra note 373, at 74. Ironically, military dress and grooming regulations that require
377.
women to conform to male requirements have the same exclusionary effect. Id. at 75. "[Dlressing female
bodies in men's clothing often exaggerates rather than mutes women's physical characteristics," preserving gender distinctions within the ranks. Id. at 74; see also Vojdik, supra note 20, at 113-18.
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assment and assault of military women sends the message that female troops
are sexual objects, not warriors;
harassment thereby polices the boundaries
3 79
of gender within the military.
The admission of women into the federal service academies in the
1970s has been met with similar hostility and harassment. The last all-male
class at West Point declared themselves the "Last Class with Balls" and
posed for a yearbook photograph holding all sorts of balls, including footballs, basketballs, and baseballs. 380 At the Naval Academy, male midshipmen told jokes about "WUBAs," a Navy acronym translated by male midshipmen to refer to female midshipmen as "Women Used By All, ,,381 or
"Women with Unbelievably Big Asses." 382 Jokes included, "What do you
call a mid who fucks a WUBA ? Too lazy to beat off. What's the difference
between a WUBA and warthog? About 200 pounds, but the WUBA has
more hair. 3 83 To this day, Air Force alumni sport license plates, t-shirts,
and other paraphernalia that proclaim, "LCWB," (for "Last Class With
Balls" or "Last Class Without Bitches (or Broads)"), defiantly proclaiming
their continued opposition to the admission of women.384 A panel appointed
to evaluate the allegations of sexual misconduct at the Air Force Academy
concluded:
While some may find this public display of animosity toward the
presence of women at the Academy humorous, it contributes to an
environment in which female cadets are made to feel unwelcome. In
the Panel's view, sanctioned displays which are derogatory toward
women diminish the role and value of women, fuel the attitudes described by an alarming number of male cadets in the climate surveys [one out of four report that women should not be at the Academy] and5 contribute to an environment that is unwelcoming of
38
women.
More than twenty years after the admission of women, sexual abuse and
harassment of females at the federal service academies continues to be substantial. Following the well-publicized reports in 2003 of the raping of Air
Sexual Harassment, Improve Gender Equality, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB. NEWS SERV., Sept. 11, 1997, at
K8778).
379.
Franke, supra note 145, at 764 ("Sexual harassment is the means by which the male harasser
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Force female cadets, a survey by the Defense Department Inspector General
found that 19% of female cadets at the Air Force Academy said they had
been assaulted while at the academy.386 Half of the women attending the
Navy, Air Force, and Army service academies reported being sexually harassed on campus. 387 In March 2005, the Department of Defense released a
report documenting that one out of seven women in the federal service
academies surveyed reported that they had been sexually assaulted by their
male peers.388
In July 2005, the Department of Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence in Military Service Academies concluded that the harassment and violence were partially rooted in the devaluation of women in
the military. 389 Despite the fact that women have been at the academy for
over twenty years, DOD reported that one out of four male cadets surveyed
reported that women do not belong at the Air Force Academy. 39° The report
cited the persistence of "hostile attitudes and inappropriate actions toward
women, and the toleration of these by some cadets and midshipmen," as
interfering with a safe environment to create new military leaders. 39' The
Task Force specifically recognized that the continued exclusion of women
from "highly regarded combat specialties" fosters an environment of hostility and harassment.392 The sexual harassment and assault of military women
sends the message that female troops are sexual objects, not warriors.393
Violence toward female troops by their male officers and peers is similarly widespread.394 In a 2003 report by the Iowa City Veterans Affairs
Medical Center, one-third of former military women treated by Veterans Affairs medical centers reported suffering rape or attempted rape during
their military careers. 395 Fourteen percent said they were gang-raped by coworkers.396 One in five women who reported 39being
raped said they be7
lieved "rape was to be expected in the military.
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Scandals at the Tailhook Association annual convention and the Aberdeen Proving Grounds graphically illustrated the widespread hostility and
violence toward women in the military. At the 1991 convention of the Tailhook Association, an elite group of Naval pilots, including three-star admirals, dozens of women filed complaints that they had been sexually assaulted by male pilots on the urine- and beer-soaked floors of the third floor
of the conference hotel, where hospitality suites featured female strippers
and prostitutes.398 Women were forced to walk through a gauntlet of nearly
300 men who groped, pinched, and fondled their buttocks, breasts, and genitals. 399 According to a subsequent Pentagon report, such attacks against
women had occurred at Tailhook conventions since 1988 and many officers
' ,4 °°
engaged in sexual misconduct "without fear of censure or retribution.
The Army suffered a similar scandal in 1997 arising from widespread reports of sexual harassment at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, a training
base for new Army recruits.4 °1
Most recently, U.S. female troops in the U.S. Central Command's theater of operation in the Middle East, including Iraq and Afghanistan, have
reported 112 incidents of rape, assault, and other forms of sexual misconduct during an eighteen-month period from August 2002 through February
2004. 402 The official number of reports likely understates the actual number
of assaults because many women are reluctant to report such incidents, fearing reprisal. The Miles Foundation, a nonprofit group that assists soldiers
who have been sexually assaulted, has received 307 reports of sexual assault
from soldiers serving in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, and Bahrain-most of
whom were female. 4 3
By moving beyond stereotyping, the argument against judicial deference to the military's discriminatory policy becomes substantially stronger.
As Judge Fletcher observed in Philips v. Perry,judicial deference to a military policy that is based upon hatred of, and prejudice toward, an excluded
class of people is unjustified. 4°4 As Kenneth Karst has argued, the institutional opposition to women in direct ground combat is no different than the
4 °5
military's former policy of excluding African-Americans or homosexuals.
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While each involves a classificatory scheme, each enforces 4a6 status hierarchy that preserves the military for white, heterosexual males. 0
The harassment and violence toward military women illustrates the
persistent hostility and denigration of female troops. By shifting the focus
from gender stereotyping to the institutional practices within the military
that construct warriors as male and masculine, the direct ground combat
exclusion appears less like a mistake in classification and more like a
fundamental means of enforcing the status of military women as secondclass citizens. The military's discriminatory policy, like the use of genderbased peremptory challenges in J.E.B. v. Alabama, perpetuates the historical
exclusion of women from the military and stigmatizes women as different
and inferior, unworthy of the role of warrior. 40 7
The combat exclusion constructs and preserves a gendered system of
labor that reflects and perpetuates male supremacy and female subordination. In this sense, the combat exclusion functions in the same way as the
anti-miscegenation laws struck down by the Supreme Court in Loving v.
Virginia. In Loving, the Supreme Court relied on its anti-subordination doctrine to strike down Virginia's anti-miscegenation law as violating the right
to equal protection.40 8 The Court rejected the notion of formal equality advanced by the state defendant that the law prohibited interracial marriages
by both blacks and whites and therefore was racially neutral because it
treated all persons equally without regard to their race. 40 9 Prohibitions
against interracial marriage, the Court held, were part and parcel of maintaining a system of racial distinction that perpetuated the subordination of
blacks under the law. 4 10 Like the anti-miscegenation statute in Loving, the
categorical exclusion of women from direct ground combat demeans and
stigmatizes women as different and inferior.
A legal challenge to the combat exclusion, as illustrated above, does not
merely vindicate the goals of formal equality. The constitutional wrong is
not simply that the military has mistakenly concluded that no woman is
capable of engaging in combat (although the exclusion clearly reflects
overly broad gender stereotypes), but that the military, through a range of
institutional practices, constructs and preserves a gendered caste system. By
406.
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making the military as an institution visible, the hostility toward women as a
group becomes plain to see. Rather than accept the military's gender norms,
opening the doors to women in combat fundamentally challenges the myth
of masculinity inside one of the most powerful institutions that continue to
deny women equal citizenship status.
CONCLUSION

While the Supreme Court has not embraced anti-subordination analysis,
it has broadened equal protection discourse to express concerns about state
action that demeans women as a class and stigmatizes women as inferior
and undeserving of full citizenship. In this Article, I have attempted to reread the Court's gender equality jurisprudence outside the conventional
framework that assumes equal protection doctrine represents a dichotomous
choice between anti-subordination and anti-classification theory. Such a
thick reading, as Reva Siegel suggests, is better suited to developing legal
arguments that shift the Court's attention from classificatory errors to concrete forms of subordination.
To the extent that equal protection doctrine is flexible, it is critical to
identify the spaces within the discursive space to develop more particularized accounts of discrimination that can persuade the Court to conceptualize
gender discrimination as a status-based harm. Focusing on the gendered
nature of roles within social institutions and the particular ways that institutional practices enforce gender segregation in the workplace, is one effective strategy to enrich the courts' understanding of discrimination. The
mechanism of harm is not merely mistaken stereotypes, but institutional
practices that reinforce gender roles and certain institutions as male and
masculine while simultaneously sending the message that women are different and inferior.
In this Article, I have sought to illustrate how this approach can be used
to challenge the exclusion of women from combat. This type of particularized analysis of the institutional practices that construct gender as difference
and rationalize women's inequality can be used to challenge other forms of
gender discrimination in traditionally male workplaces and institutions. Dissolving the supposed dichotomy of anti-classification and anti-subordination
is an important first step to rethinking new strategies to combat the many
forms of state-sponsored discrimination.

